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Abstract 
 
Media algorithms are increasing in use among popular social networking sites (Geiger, 2009). 
Algorithms are used to sort a users’ social media feed based on relevance and interest rather than 
content publish time (Geiger, 2009). Widely accepted and recognized as influential in the media 
sector, algorithms create a highly personalized experience for the individual viewer. However, 
some scholars argue the specified curation of media based on a user’s personal preferences leads 
to a “filter bubble,” an online-based self-fulfilling prophecy in which users’ pre-existing opinions 
are continually reaffirmed. Because of this, this thesis will examine the intersection of algorithms 
and media theory. A survey will explore if media algorithms play a role in diminishing public 
discourse within public sphere theory as outlined by Jürgen Habermas. Under the Habermasian 
ideal, the public sphere works as a place for open and unrestricted discourse of all individuals. 
However, connecting like-minded users and creating highly specified social media feeds through 
algorithms “…amplify and systematically move…talking points into the mainstream political 
discourse” (Daniels, 2018). These talking points are then discussed among social media users 
who likely view the same content based on their similar interests and algorithms. Other media 
theorists such as Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1974) argue that individuals feel a “spiral of 
silence” when they express a minority opinion. This silence is placed in an interesting position as 
individuals rarely face a minority opinion in the hands of algorithm technology. Though 
sophisticated algorithms, public discourse is limited to a select few topics for like-minded users, 
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Almost without notice, media algorithms have become a central technological advance 
touching nearly every American life (Peterson-Salahuddin & Diakopoulos, 2021). The ability to 
sort a users’ feed based on user relevance and interest rather than the time that content is 
published allows for a unique, adaptive, and individualized social media experience (Geiger, 
2009). Media algorithms personalize online content by running advanced systems of code while 
users interact with media (McKelvey et al., 2015). These individualized codes based on users’ 
behaviors ultimately rank media in a customized manner (Milan, 2015). Cheap, easy-to-access 
cloud storage systems and increased computing power allow algorithms to exclude and filter 
media from users while providing highly personalized content. The automated process is 
completed on a scale and timeframe not humanly possible, therefore increasing the speed of 
content production. Facebook’s “like” button, Twitter’s “trending” feed, and Instagram’s 
“discover” page operate under such algorithms, working at the interpersonal level in order to 
provide personalized content to users (Gillespie, 2014). While typically opaque, media 
algorithms work to appear neutral and reduce the presence of “non-human actors” (Milan, 2015). 
As algorithms continue to advance and operate under the guise of objectivity, social media has 
become the “curators of public discourse” (Gillespie, 2014). These “free” social networking 
sites strip users of personal information as they browse content, ultimately providing their users 
with a content feed “personalized” on one’s web browsing habits. While an alluring feature of 
modern social networking, this “filter bubble” that determines the content seen by specific users 
drastically decides which content is seen as trending, predominant, and important (Geiger, 2009). 
These sophisticated algorithms act as editors of media content but are not treated or recognized 
as such (Geiger, 2009). Researchers Ballinger & Reese (2001) argue that algorithms act as 
2 
 
gatekeepers working to edit and make advanced decisions about the information seen as relevant 
to a specific user (Ballinger & Reese, 2001). The internet has “…reconfigured [traditional] 
dynamics by decoupling production, dissemination, and curation,” of news (Geiger, 2009). 
Often, individually curated media is advertised as “news” rather than personalized content. There 
is a recognizable and distinct value in widely used mechanisms for public discourse; the ability 
of users to act as both online content consumers and creators ideally allows for public discourse 
to flourish (Caplan & Boyd, 2016). Thanks to veils of anonymity, the virtual realm is one in 
which matters of public opinion are, in theory at least, free to discuss. However, these advanced 
algorithms are a cause for concern regarding the theoretical nature of online discourse. A hyper- 
personalized experience created and customized by digital media is pliable and easily influenced, 
thus calling for a reimagination of the way media scholars study and understand digital 
communication (Geiger, 2009). 
One of these reexaminations stands at the intersection of personalized media and media 
theory. Public sphere theory, as first defined by Jürgen Habermas (1964), emphasizes the free 
exchange of public ideas and discourse about matters of public opinion. Some of these ideas 
have come to fruition in the online realm, including the easy and often free distribution of public 
information via the internet (Napoli, 2014). However, new and advancing systems of code place 
the Habermassian public sphere in a unique position due to the algorithmic ability to filter out 
content deemed “irrelevant” to certain users. This “filter bubble” appears as users are limited to 
content that they align with, shielding them from viewing disliked content (Napoli, 2014). 
Similarly, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1974) theorized a “spiral of silence” faced by individuals 
when feeling extreme isolation accompanied with a minority opinion, another type of filtering by 
exclusion from discourse (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). Algorithms place this theory in an interesting 
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position; often disguising personal preferences as the majority opinion, the filtered universe has 
the illusion of being the reality. Facing content of diverging opinion when accustomed to 
accepted content may incite an averse and silent reaction (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). 
One of these sophisticated algorithms is hosted by TikTok (Anderson, 2020). The video- 
sharing social networking site released in 2017 and owned by Chinese company ByteDance is 
continually gaining popularity; it was the fifth-most downloaded app worldwide in the third 
quarter of 2019 (Anderson, 2020). Predicted to have over 88 American million users by 2024, 
the app continues to soar within younger audiences (Tankovska, 2021). Females aged 10-24 
account for 28.6% of all unique visits for the site (Clement, 2019). Moreover, 50% of all time 
spent on TikTok was used for “social communication”, furthering the social circles created in the 
online realm (Tankovska, 2021). This, coupled with light restrictions for video posting, ideally 
allows for opinions to be shared freely. The app is primarily algorithm driven and is recognized 
for its increasingly sophisticated recommendation system. This system curates an individualized 
set of videos upon each user interaction, creating an entirely customized “For You Page” each 
time the app is opened ("How TikTok recommends videos #ForYou", 2020). Behind the TikTok 
algorithm lies an intense system of code: data is collected from users based on previous video 
interactions including liked hashtags, sounds, captions, video topics, and device settings to 
determine the videos that are “relevant” to individual users. Once collected by the algorithm, 
users are then presented with a customized set of videos. This advanced algorithm differentiates 
itself from other social media sites that revolve around a “following” of certain users. While 
Facebook and Twitter rely on users to choose who to follow and befriend, TikTok allows a video 
created by a user with zero followers to become “viral” overnight (Anderson, 2020). TikTok 
relies on likes and dislikes to curate video content, disregarding the older algorithm technologies 
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that rely on a specific number of followers. As a “...social network that has nothing to do with 
one’s social network,” TikTok stands as an alluring app for the self-made celebrities of 
Generation Z (Tolentino, 2019). Captivating to users but disguised as a universal truth, the 
ability of advanced algorithms to create a filter bubble based upon previously established ideas 
leads to a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. The TikTok algorithm provides individuals with 
content they are likely to understand, enjoy, and agree with, thus perpetuating existing beliefs 
and opinions. 
The TikTok algorithm has specifically created an interesting convergence of media 
theory and social networking. This paper will explore this intersection. Public sphere theory has 
shifted in the age of digital news gathering but requires deep examination regarding algorithms 
and news gathering (Poor, 2006). With the understanding that algorithms play an important role 
in defining and influencing virtual public spheres, the analysis of how the TikTok algorithm 
influences online news and public discourse specifically through the lens of political ideology is 
a key area of media research. As advanced systems of code become more broadly accepted and 
integrated into content strategy and development, a shift in the understanding of media theory 
and news gathering is necessary (Butcher, 2012). 
This study aims to examine the intersection of media theory regarding discourse and 
algorithms for news gathering. Focusing research efforts on TikTok allows for the examination 
of the impact of the TikTok algorithm on public and political discourse. By connecting like- 
minded users and facilitating an online area of discourse, the Habermassian public sphere is 
significantly impacted; the filtering of content shapes what users see and can determine the tone 
of public discourse. The study conducts an online survey in order to measure this impact and 
understand if the effects of media algorithms diminish public discourse in online public spheres. 
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Survey questions regarding political affiliation and content curation will examine the 
polarization of media algorithms and their hindrance of ideological discourse. Limiting content 
based on user preference will lead to the diminishment of public discourse based on political 
ideology. Moreover, users will feel more inclined to engage with a TikTok video if the video 
aligns with their political beliefs because they feel that they are in an accepting environment to 
do so. Finally, individuals who identify as conservative will be more likely to share their political 





II.1 The Habermassian Public Sphere 
 
Public sphere theory, as created and first defined by Jürgen Habermas (1964) acts as a 
“…realm of social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed,” 
(Habermas et al., 1964). Notably, the public sphere creates a space where individuals can discuss 
matters of public importance. Habermas emphasizes the importance of the “medium of talk” that 
the public sphere creates, making it possible for individuals to discuss matters of public interest 
(Hauser, 1999). Occasionally, this public sphere of open and unrestricted discourse results in a 
common judgment made by the people, thus furthering the process of democratic ideology 
(Hauser, 1999). These people, Habermas quickly notes, are all granted entrance to the public 
sphere, explaining that “access [to the public sphere] is guaranteed to all citizens,” through a 
bourgeois society of open, public discourse (Habermas et al., 1964). The ideal public sphere, 
according to Habermas, would “…contribute to democracy and is not shaped by, but is 
facilitated through media, greater access to information, and robust discourse and debate about 
common issues of democratic societies,” (Houlb, 1991). Since its establishment, this theory 
crosses many fields of study, ranging from sociology, political science, and media theory as the 
public sphere acts as a medium between society and state, making it a useful tool for democratic 
and social processes (Holub, 1991). 
However, this theory is criticized for its idealized nature and for making broad 
assumptions based on the accessibility of few. While Habermas argues for accessibility to the 
public sphere for all individuals, an increasing reality of exclusion surfaces as public discourse is 
often shaped by the opinions and accessibility of a limited number of people. Habermas pointed 
to an idealized form of public discourse and “…paints a picture of a public sphere that never 
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existed,” as barriers reduce the ability of individuals to enter the public sphere (Caplan & Boyd, 
2016). Habermas recognized these barriers in the late-twentieth century when he revisited his 
theory, explaining that the public sphere had “atrophied” in a society in which the barriers to 
entry are so high (Habermas, 1998). Habermas (1998) also touches on the expanding internet 
realm, creating a “…predominate prediction that the internet would usher in a rebirth of the 
public sphere,” and drawing from accounts that the internet would transform society for the 
better, thus proving the inherent idealisms within the Habermasssian public sphere (Geiger, 
2009). Habermas has remained silent throughout the majority of the internet’s expanse with the 
exception of a 2006 keynote speech in which he addressed “bloggers” playing little more than a 
“parasitical role” for online discussions (Habermas, 2006). While recognizing the impact of the 
online realm, Habermas denies its ability to facilitate discourse within the public sphere. 
In the wake of the digital revolution, new areas of thought arise for public sphere theory. 
One, the ability of the internet to disseminate information quickly, easily, and cheaply allow for 
individuals to obtain news in a much different fashion than Habermas initially intended. Low 
barriers of entry to the online public sphere of social networking allow for an influx of public 
opinion and discourse (Houlb, 1991). 
 
 
II.2 Spiral of Silence 
 
Like Habermas, other media theorists have reimagined their theories in the wake of 
online newsgathering. Spiral of silence theory, as proposed by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann 
(1974), suggests that the climate of opinion will shape an individual’s willingness to speak 
publicly on certain topics, thus influencing one’s perception of others and their opinions (Schulz 
& Roessler, 2012). Arguing that individuals will readjust their willingness to share their political 
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beliefs based on the perceived climate of the topic, Noelle-Neumann worked to explore why 
individuals felt the need to remain silent if their opinion diverged from the majority. Her 1974 
research found that individuals who perceive that the majority agree with their opinions 
demonstrate a greater tendency to publicly share, while those in the minority tend to conceal 
their opinions (Gearhart & Zhang, 2015). The theory heavily relies on the distinct moral 
components of a topic, and Noelle-Neumann recognizes that controversial issues tend to lead 
individuals into deeper silence when diverging from the minority. Controversial issues of public 
opinion are likely to be most impacted by this spiral of silence (Gearheart & Zhang, 2015). 
Motivated by fear and isolation, this silence further establishes the prevailing opinion (Gearheart 
& Zhang, 2015). Further, the 1974 media landscape widely differs from the advent of today’s 
new media. Noelle-Neumann explained that individuals continually receive two sources of 
information when seeking public opinion: mass media and individual social environment 
(Noelle-Neumann, 1991). As individuals seek to formulate opinions regarding public opinion, 
they look to their social and news-gathering environments. With this, she includes a strong 
argument that media reporting in the 1970s was fueled by an “unambiguous” tone, ultimately 
leading to media consonance (Noelle-Neumann, 1991). This homogeneity throughout news 
sources allowed for clear public opinion and socially accepted discourse (Noelle-Neumann, 
1991). However, as news gathering shifts to the online realm and sources become heavily 
polarized, the “spiral of silence” faced by individuals also changes. 
Research suggests this silence has increased in the wake of the digital revolution. We see 
the distinct components of social networking blending: TikTok (and other social networking 
sites) allows individuals to formulate opinions from both news media as well as online users who 
act as social circles, aligning with Noelle-Neumann’s theory. Social networking sites built 
9 
 
around establishing connection and friendship require public opinion sharing, ultimately refining 
the site’s content selection algorithm. Acting as a sort of surveillance feature, media algorithms 
“...create a chilling effect on democratic discourse by stifling the expression of minority political 
views,” (Stoycheff, 2016). Digital and social media create an online realm for increased sharing 
of information; however, personalized media algorithms narrow media focus to an accepted 
opinion of the individual (Stoycheff, 2016). Unlike the media consonance of the 1970s as 
proposed by Noelle-Neumann, today’s special interest media is easily obtained for specific target 
groups. Modern television methods (i.e. network streaming) allow for partisan media to flourish 
and as individuals seek these sites and share media content pertaining to their specific ideology, 
their individual algorithms adhere to these preferences (Schulz & Roessler, 2012). Research also 
shows that online news furthers partisanship and polarization of users, as “...consuming 
supportive partisan news outlets is associated with perceiving that other people share one’s 
opinions,” (Wang et al., 2017). Today’s fragmented news gathering allows for a reexamination 
of the use of liberal and conservative news outlets as support for furthering one’s own beliefs. 
The increase of partisanship, special interest news, and advanced algorithms rarely places 
individuals in the minority when sharing opinions online. Further research has proven the deep 
divide across partisan lines. Conservative focused news sites like Parler and WeeMee focus upon 
“free speech” and the limitation of banning users; however, ultimately increase the partisan 
discourse between like-minded users (Wang et al., 2017). Individuals identifying as conservative 
and primarily using social media apps like Parler and WeeMee reported greater perceived 
support for their conservative beliefs, resulting in greater willingness to share online (Wang et 
al., 2017). Because of this, and specifically within the digital revolution of news gathering, the 
spiral of silence theory warns that a lack of diverse views could lead to the hindrance of 
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democratic views. Strict partisan sharing reveals negative consequences and a “...distorted sense 
of reality” in news gathering (Su et al., 2019). Ultimately this distorted view of reality leads to 
the increase of partisan opinion sharing, ultimately decreasing the “spiral of silence” as users 
rarely feel that they are of a minority opinion (Schulz & Roessler, 2012). 
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III. The Intersection of Algorithms and Public Discourse 
 
As an ever-evolving mode of communication in the 21st   century, online discourse remains 
central to modern life. In the age of new media, critiques have continued to arise about the role 
of media, the public sphere, and spiral of silence theory. Though researchers continually examine 
the idea of the internet acting as a stand-alone public sphere, this remains a controversial topic as 
two belief systems appear. 
The first points in favor of an online public sphere. The potential for mass distribution of 
ideas in an easy to access fashion is an alluring feature of digital media. The digital divide, or the 
“...gap between those who have and who do not have access to computers and the internet,” has 
raised concern about the true equality and freedom within the online realm (van Dijk, 2006). Due 
to factors like socio-economic status, geography, and education status, access to the online public 
sphere limits some individuals (Cullen, 2001). States and nations that are less wealthy face 
higher barriers to entry of the online realm as technology often remains expensive and 
inaccessible. Not having access to these technologies is a societal and educational handicap, and 
some argue that the gap widens as more individuals gain access, leaving others behind (Cullen, 
2001). However, as the twenty-first century continues and the internet grows in strength and size, 
some scholars argue that the digital divide is closing. At least two factors lead to the decrease of 
this gap: the steady decrease of cost to use and the steady increase of knowledge and ease of use 
(Comapine, 2001). The ability of smartphones to act as personal computers creates more access 
to the online realm (Servon, 2004). Moreover, social networking sites, like TikTok, are free and 
available for download on any smartphone, computer, or tablet. Public access computers, like 
those found in public libraries, have the ability to both download and/or use the application from 
a webcam and desktop computer. Likewise, the ease of use within the online realm continues to 
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grow (Compaine, 2001). The increased use of applications and social media networks aid in the 
strengthening of media literacy (Servon, 2004). Like the public sphere theorized by Habermaas, 
barriers still exist for individuals to enter the sphere of public discourse. However, as technology 
becomes easier to access and use, scholars credit the internet as a place in which discourse 
continues to grow. Proponents of public sphere theory see the internet “...as a means for 
expansion of citizen deliberation,” as a seemingly unlimited number of people can discuss 
matters of public opinion (Dahlberg, 2007). New media ushered by the rise of the internet allows 
for previously marginalized users to engage with the broader public (Gerhards & Schäfer, 2010). 
Secondly, the internet offers a veil of anonymity that facilitates controversial public 
discourse (Geiger, 2009). By remaining anonymous online, a user may feel more comfortable 
engaging in a public sphere, thus increasing contentious discussion. James Gachau (2016) 
provides an example of this in his study of Facebook groups facilitating the discourse of 
politically and religiously oppressed Kenyan citizens. Because of their disassociation with the 
“overwhelmingly and oppressive Christian Kenyan public sphere,” these individuals took to 
social media which “…stepped into the void thus created by the corporatized and 
institutionalized media,” (Gachau, 2016). Because of the walls created by a private Facebook 
group, social media allowed for individuals to express feelings and ideas that would otherwise be 
discouraged. Anonymity within the internet allows individuals to contribute and debate views on 
topics such as politics, art, and moral dilemmas (Kang et al., 2013). This sense of anonymity 
allows users to protect themselves from personal threats or speaking on matters of controversy 
(Kang et al., 2013). This is also a benefit of online discourse within the spiral of silence theory. 
As individuals have the option of remaining anonymous, fear of isolation decreases, ultimately 
allowing for the increased sharing of diverging opinions. Neither public sphere theory or spiral 
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of silence theory accounts for anonymity provided by the internet; the ability of users to 
anonymously share opinions allows for them to engage with controversial discussion (Gearheart 
& Zhang, 2015). The online public sphere remains a diverging realm of public discourse, and 
the ability of a user to remain behind a screen is a distinct difference between the Habermassian 
and digital public spheres. 
Likewise, there are few restrictions to creating an online social media account, therefore 
furthering the idea of low barriers of entry of the online public sphere. The potential for the mass 
distribution of ideas along with the fact that individuals can enter the online realm inherently 
points toward the Habermassian public sphere (Kang et al., 2013). As a parallel to the public 
sphere first theorized by Habermaas, most individuals have the ability to enter social media sites 
with little to no restriction on their individual discourse. This points in favor of the online public 
sphere. 
However, in the age of digital media, a differing line of thought appears. Led by 
researchers like Howard Rheingold (2000), social scientists and media researchers argue that the 
barriers of entry to the internet sphere are actually higher as online follower count determines 
reach of message, ultimately decreasing public discourse due to algorithmic hurdles (Rheingold, 
2000). Without a large number of followers who regularly interact with specific media to break 
through an advanced algorithm, unrelated content is likely to remain unseen by certain users. As 
economic strongholds (like AT&T and Comcast) gain more traction in the internet realm, the 
public sphere becomes almost inaccessible for non-corporate actors (i.e. an individual without 
corporate backing or funding) to reach their audiences. Rheingold explains the possibility of true 
discourse to flourish on the internet, but likewise warns of a vast opportunity for 
commodification based on the elite economic and political spheres (Rheingold, 2000). 
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Debate about the intersection of media and dissemination of public opinion has been 
contentious. The “digital revolution” accelerated by the internet and certain social media 
platforms has allowed for easy access to information and quick dissemination of public news. 
Research suggests that internet-based technologies “...adapt themselves into the current political 
culture rather than create a new one,” ultimately leaving the democratic principle of public 
discourse stale (Papacharissi, 2002). This polarization of media diverges from the Habermassian 
public sphere. Further, Jessie Daniels (2018) provides an example of the shift in online discourse 
through the filter of algorithms. Through hyper-personalized content, algorithms help connect 
like-minded users, fostering a place for discussion about the agreed upon topic (Daniels, 2018). 
The personalization of media through “…the use of algorithms and the rise of targeted 
advertising has raised questions about how algorithms serve to divide individuals, instead of 
uniting them through common concerns,” (Caplan & Boyd, 2016). Daniels (2018) specifically 
studies this dynamic in her examination of the rise of the online alt-right movement in the wake 
of the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Finding that “algorithms deliver search 
results for those who seek confirmation….and connect newcomers to like-minded racists,” 
Daniels provides a clear example regarding the ability of algorithms on Facebook to block 
certain views while promoting others (Daniels, 2018). Based on follower interaction, reach, and 
personal relevance, individuals are more likely to see content with which they agree. Simply put, 
Daniels’ research explains that algorithms “…amplify and systematically move…talking points 
into the mainstream political discourse” (Daniels, 2018). Though important as current events, 
these talking points are often seen as salient because of the density in which personalized 
algorithms present them. This has gained traction as new social media apps have popularized 
thus advancing algorithms and creating a multitude of Habermasian “virtual coffee shops” filled 
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with like-minded users (Geiger, 2009). By facilitating a more deliberative public sphere, public 
discourse diminishes because of a hyper-focused and like-minded subject matter (Geiger, 2009). 
Ultra-specified “virtual shops”, like topic-based chat rooms or comment sections, come with 
decreased diversity of viewpoints. While advanced algorithms may increase public discourse 
between like-minded users, this leads to a diminished exposure to opposing views, a major tenant 
of democratic processes. 
Algorithms have the ability to influence tangible decision-making as well. Another 
concern of the intersection of algorithms, the public sphere, and political affiliation is a 
phenomenon known as “digital gerrymandering” (Zittrain, 2014). The increasing ability of 
algorithms to heavily influence an individual's voting decision (digital gerrymandering) directly 
contradicts the Habermassian public sphere and its democratic principles. Zittrain (2014) 
continually points to a Facebook study as evidence of this phenomenon (Zittrain, 2014). The 
study placed politically charged social media graphics in the news feeds of certain Facebook 
users, then tracked the users’ political affiliation and voting preferences. By manipulating the 
content seen by users, the study found that algorithms have the ability to influence users toward 
or away from a specific political affiliation based upon the type of graphic intentionally placed in 
one’s newsfeed (Zittrain, 2014). Zittrain argues this is a diminishing effect of the virtual public 
sphere; by simply placing political graphics within specific users’ media feeds, automated 
algorithms have the ability to influence their voting and political preferences (Zittrain, 2014). 
Similarly, concerns rise when considering digital media and its ability to disseminate news. 
Functioning in a similar fashion as a newspaper editor, Facebook’s algorithm makes decisions 
about the information that is relevant to users and labels it as “trending”, ultimately framing the 
issues seen as salient by a specific user (Ballinger & Reese, 2001). This is a concern for the 
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public sphere as a limited number of individually based topics are presented to users as highly 
important breaking news, thus limiting multiple viewpoints within the public sphere. Further, the 
topics labeled as breaking news may instead be an individually curated set of content, like an 
advertisement targeting a single user. This is even more concerning as Facebook and Google 
own about 75% of the U.S. digital advertising budget with a portion dedicated to algorithmic 
media (Pasquale, 2018). Again, we see irony within the internet that begins to shine: as 
information becomes easier to access via social media sites, the dissemination of that information 
increasingly narrows and may even shape, influence, or control the news in which people 
receive. 
 
III.1 Criticism of Media Algorithms and the Online Public Discourse 
 
While this area of research continues to expand as the internet and online news evolves, 
the idea that media algorithms act as a deterrent of public discourse is debated. Some argue that 
media algorithms and online news dissemination allow for the advancement for public discourse. 
Two major critiques appear. 
First is the idea that media algorithms continue to make social networking and internet 
access cheaper and easier to use goes against the digital divide argument. The content made 
possible by the digital revolution “…has the potential to make information more available and 
easier to distribute and enable a greater number of more diverse individuals to participate in the 
political, economic, and cultural spheres, (Caplan & Boyd, 2016). Again, we see the benefit of 
social media users acting as media producers as well as consumers, ultimately proving the 
inherent democratic tendency of new media. Similarly, researchers Bodó, Helberger, Eskens, and 
Möller (2018) argue that the answer to the growing need for diversity and representation within 
the Habermassian public sphere is in fact, the internet (Bodó et al., 2018). The internet is 
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“…viewed as an opportunity to empower more diverse voices, sources, and content, especially 
for those who could not ‘break’ into traditional media,” (Bodó et al., 2018). The ability of the 
TikTok algorithm to make a video “viral” overnight has little to do with a users’ following or 
popularity but everything to do with their content and relatability (Tolentino, 2019). However, 
algorithms highlight a crack in this logic: rather than focusing on individuals increasing diversity 
within the digital realm, algorithms instead limit the content created and consumed by users 
because of their advancing ability of decreasing what is seen by others. Although appearing more 
easily accessible and open on the internet, the barriers of entry to the public sphere remain high 
due to the hyper-sensitive content selection made possible by algorithms. 
A second critique, one rooted in the technological aspects of algorithms, surfaces as well. 
 
The idea that algorithms influence users’ lives in drastic ways (influencing voting or shaping 
news gathering) ignores the fact that some users are well equipped in the practice of online 
newsgathering. Some users can distinguish between a curated advertisement and real, breaking 
news because of years of online media use. Cathy Davidson, Duke University professor and 
author, argues that algorithmic literacy “should be integrated into educational philosophy,” 
(Caplan & Boyd, 2016). Nick Diakopoulos (2019) agrees that examining the human influence 
embedded within automation and algorithm creation finds that those who are media literate are 
not as easily influenced by algorithms (Diakopoulos, 2019). Although “the help of computer 
algorithms…are fundamentally changing the creation, dissemination, and reception of the news,” 
Diakopoulos focuses on journalists, media conglomerates, and tech professionals that create 
these advanced algorithms. He argues that human influence is ingrained within, therefore the 
influence of algorithms is smaller than anticipated. However, the power of advancing technology 
to influence and shape the online human experience is remarkable. While some users display 
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media literacy, the majority of online users do not, “….leaving many individuals feeling silent, 
thus creating and perpetuating inequalities,” (Caplan & Boyd, 2016). Directly contradicting the 
expectation of democratic principles embedded within the online public sphere, algorithms 







A survey was conducted in order to understand the saturation of the influence of media 
algorithms on social media users. It is important to understand the influence as well as the 
recognition of the TikTok algorithm in order to investigate the intersection of media theory and 
digital newsgathering. While distributed online via the Qualtrics survey system, this study’s 
target population was determined by three factors. 
First, the target age group for this study is individuals aged 18-24. While the survey 
collected data from any participating individual above the age of 18, this study found the greatest 
importance within the 18-24 age group. This group was selected because it holds the largest 
number of unique visitors to the TikTok site; 25.8% of adult TikTok users fall into this age 
category (TikTok: How Fast Is It Growing in the US, And Who’s Using It, 2019). Likewise, these 
individuals are potentially new and first-time voters. This is distinctly important as the number of 
first-time voters in this age category more than doubled between the 2016 and 2020 elections 
(Moore & Hinckle, 2020). 
Second, data was primarily analyzed for participants who self-reported a high use of 
TikTok. Participants who reported at or above “a moderate amount” of TikTok usage were 
included in data collection. Individuals who were comfortable with the app and its features at the 
time in which they were surveyed were necessary for the analysis of TikTok related research. 
Finally, individuals who self-reported at or above “somewhat agree” when asked if they 
had a strong interest in politics were included for data analysis. The combination of political 
interest and TikTok usage are necessary for the present study as these individuals would be 
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familiar with the TikTok “For You Page” and may interact with political videos because of their 
interest and the algorithm’s advanced nature. 
Participants were recruited primarily through emails and social media postings. Email 
recruitment involved emails from the principal investigator, University of Arkansas faculty, and 
the University of Arkansas automated news emails (Newswire and Listserv software). Social 
media posts on Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook were also used to recruit participants of all 
ages. The survey and research were also featured on UATV, a broadcast channel run by the 






Following participant recruitment via email or social media post, participants voluntarily 
clicked the provided link to the survey. The link directed them to an informed consent form via 
the online survey system, Qualtrics. After using an electronic signature feature to indicate 
consent, participants were redirected to a second Qualtrics page containing the survey questions. 
Once redirected, participants were then able to begin the survey. Participants who indicated they 
were under 18 years of age were immediately redirected to the end of the survey. All other 





This study utilized a 20-question survey to measure an individual’s experience with 
TikTok, political ideology, and the TikTok algorithm (see Appendix A). Responses to these 
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items are coded using a Likert-type scale. The survey was created by the principal investigator. 




Based on current media research, the following hypotheses will be proposed: 
H1: Limiting content based on user preference and algorithms will lead to the 
diminishment of public discourse based on political ideology. 
H2: Users will feel more inclined to engage with a TikTok video if the video aligns with 
their political beliefs. 
H3: Individuals who self-identify as conservative will be more likely to share their 
political beliefs on social media platforms such as TikTok. 
 
IV.5 Research Questions 
 
The following research questions will be asked: 
 
RQ1: Do the results of media algorithms diminish the effects of the public sphere 
because of their hyper-focused content selection, ultimately limiting the content seen by 
users? 
RQ2: Do media algorithms allow such highly personalized refinement to create 
counterpublic spheres? 
RQ3: Do the results of media algorithms increase political polarization, thus influencing 
user’s willingness to speak out about controversial topics? 
RQ4: Are individuals more likely to experience a “spiral of silence” during the digital 





While active from February 16, 2021 through March 10, 2021, the current study recruited 
137 participants, aged 18 and older. Participants voluntarily agreed to complete an online, 
independent survey. From the total sample, filters were applied in order to better fit the target 
population fitting the inclusion criteria. Once applied, the data was filtered to 71 total responses, 
meeting both TikTok use and political interest filters. 
For the purposes of this study, responses from the unfiltered (n=137) and filtered (n=71) 




V.1 Unfiltered Condition: All Responses 
 
The average participant of the current study was a white female aged 18-24. From the 
137 unfiltered responses, 102 (73.91%) identified as female. The largest set of data was drawn 
from individuals aged 18-24. This age group logged 84 responses (59.14%), ultimately 
supporting the targeted age group for this study. This target age group reflects the national 
average of TikTok users, a significant strength of the current study (Moore & Hinckle, 2020). In 
the unfiltered condition, the age groups of 45-54 and 55-64 logged 16 (11.27%) and 14 (9.86%) 
responses, respectively. These two age groups received the second and third highest number of 
responses. The vast majority (91.67%) of individuals are white. Because of this, this study 
received skewed results and can only be generalized to white, college-aged females. 
Political affiliation remained roughly consistent regardless of unfiltered or filtered 
conditions. The split between Republican (33.58%) and Democrat (36.50%) participants is 
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roughly equal, a strength of this study. Although more Democrats participated in this study, 




Figure 1: Political affiliation of all participants. 
Note: Before campus and final distribution, the vast majority of individuals self-identified as 
Republican. 
n = 137. 
 
V.2 Filtered Condition: TikTok Use 
 
Under the filtered condition (“moderate” TikTok use, “somewhat” interested in politics) 
the average participant reflected that of the unfiltered condition. The average response came 
from a white female, aged 18-24. From these filtered responses, most individuals self-reported 
using TikTok “a lot” with most participants spending an average of 2-3 hours per day on the app 






Figure 2: Average use of TikTok for filtered population. 
n= 71 
 
Regarding individual recognition of the TikTok algorithm, the data suggests that 
individuals within the filtered condition are very aware of the application’s recommendation 
system. The vast majority of participants (81.82%) “strongly agree” that their “For You Page” 
adapts to content they agree with. Only 8 of the filtered participants felt ambivalent toward this 










Similarly, the majority of individuals noticed that their “For You Page” provided content 
that was different from others’ content feeds. Forty-five respondents reported they “strongly 
agree” and 16 respondents reported they “somewhat agree” when asked if their “For You Page” 
was different from their peers. Most participants (61.97%) felt that TikTok cultivates videos that 
are of specific interest to them. Once again highlighting the adaptability and individualization of 
the TikTok algorithm, participants were confident that their “For You Page” differed based on 
their individual likes and dislikes. 
However, participants were more hesitant when asked about the exclusion of content. 
 
Responses varied (σ = 1.09) when asked if they noticed their “For You Page” shielding content 
that they do not agree with. Most individuals (49.30%) “somewhat agreed” that the TikTok 
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algorithm shields certain types of content from them based on their interests, likes, and dislikes. 
Only one (1.40%) individual “strongly disagreed” that the recommendation system hid disliked 




Figure 4: Total of 74.65% of participants either “strongly” or “somewhat” agree that their 
TikTok “For You Page” shields content that they don’t agree with. 
n = 71 
 
 
V.3: Filtered Condition: Political Interest 
 
Within the 71 filtered responses, 36 individuals (50.70%) “strongly agreed” that they 
were interested in politics. Because of the advanced nature of the TikTok algorithm, these 
individuals were likely to receive politically based content in their “For You Page” based on 
their high political interest. Within the filtered condition, the largest group of participants (37) 
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identified as Democrats while 20 participants identified as Republican. Fourteen participants 
identified as “independent” or “something else''. 
 
Figure 5: Political affiliation of filtered population. 
n = 71 
 
Within this condition, most participants (49.30%) “somewhat agree” that they enjoy 
politically based TikTok content. These responses appear to be inconsistent with the 36 
individuals who “strongly agree” that they enjoy politics. Likewise, when asked to rank the 
likelihood of commenting on a TikTok about liberalism or conservatism, 30.99% of participants 
were “extremely unlikely” to comment at all. Here, individual users are presented with content 





Figure 6: Enjoyment of political TikTok videos. 
n = 71 
 
 
Consistent with the above findings, the vast majority of individuals (28) in this filtered 
condition reported that they are “extremely unlikely” to defend their political beliefs on TikTok. 






Figure 7: Participants are “extremely unlikely” to defend their political beliefs on TikTok. 
N = 71 
Note: Both the filtered and unfiltered conditions provided moderately consistent results. 
 
 
Again, despite enjoying politics and recognizing the TikTok algorithm at work, 








Through survey research and detailed literature review, this thesis sought to provide 
insights to the intersection of media theory and advanced media algorithms. Research questions 
examined (a) how media algorithms diminish the effects of the public sphere, (b) if algorithms 
create counter public spheres through highly personalized content, (c) if results of these 
algorithms increase polarization, thus influencing user’s willingness to speak out, and (d) if 
individuals are more likely to experience a “spiral of silence” during the digital age of news 
gathering. The study’s findings align with some, but not all, of these research questions. 
 
 
RQ1: Do the results of media algorithms diminish the effects of the public sphere 




Findings from the Qualtrics survey show that individuals meeting the filtered condition 
(“moderate” TikTok usage, “somewhat” interested in politics) are aware that their TikTok feed is 
highly filtered and adapts to agreeable content (see figure 3). Likewise, most participants notice 
their “For You Page” tends to shield content they disagree with (see figure 4). Because of this 
exclusion of content, there is evidence to suggest that algorithms diminish the “free and open” 
idea exchange of the Habermasian public sphere. Habermas’ public sphere theory suggests that 
all citizens are guaranteed access to discuss matters of public opinion and importance in a 
restriction-free setting (Habermas et al., 1964). While the online realm provides a remedy to 
some of the issues regarding public discourse (including anonymity and interest-based discussion 
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forums), the exclusion of certain online content goes against the nature of the Habbermassian 
public sphere (Houlb, 1991). The automatic filtering of content and hyper-personalized nature of 
algorithms curates videos for the specific user. These videos, based on pre-existing likes and 
dislikes, further the algorithm as individuals are presented with content they are likely to enjoy. 
Advanced algorithms, like the recommendation system championed by TikTok, call for a 
reimagination of public sphere theory - a realm in which content is run through a filter in order to 
determine the track of public discourse. 
 
 
RQ2: Do media algorithms allow such highly personalized refinement, ultimately 
creating counterpublic spheres? 
 
 
The analysis of RQ2 requires a third layer to the filtered condition: the analysis of data 
based on political affiliation. The idea of counterpublic spheres, as coined by Nancy Fraser 
(1990) are the smaller public spheres that come together to discuss topics that affect their lives, 
but not the public sphere as a whole (Gachau, 2016). For this study, the counterpublic spheres 
used for consideration are based on political affiliation (Republican or Democrat). As the two 
groups have differing interests (and therefore, differing concerns about public advancement) the 
political affiliation of participants plays a key role in the discussion of public opinion and 
counterpublic spheres. 
Because of the small sample size and limited time to collect responses, these survey 
results do not allow for insight regarding the creation of counterpublic sphere. However, the 
responses highlight the willingness to engage in partisan discourse among Republican and 
Democrat participants. Responses show that Republican participants “neither agree nor disagree” 
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that they will engage with a TikTok video even if it reflects their conservative beliefs (see figure 
8). Moreover, even if fellow TikTok users and commenters agreed with their conservative views, 
Republicans still responded that they are “extremely unlikely” to comment on a TikTok video. 
No participants felt that they are “extremely likely” to comment on a video under these 
conditions. This finding is contrary to the predicted hypotheses (H2: Users will feel more 
inclined to engage with a TikTok video if the video aligns with their political beliefs, and H3: 
Individuals who self-identify as conservative will be more likely to share their political beliefs on 
social media platforms such as TikTok). Even while surrounded by similar opinions, Republicans 
were unlikely to engage in any sort of online political discussion. Contradicting the existing 
literature (Wang et al., 2017), these findings open the door for future research about online 
sharing based on political affiliation. 
Like Republicans, Democrat participants shared the same sentiments. Most Democrats 
were unlikely to engage with a TikTok video even if the poster reflected their political beliefs 
(see figure 8). If acting as a counterpublic sphere, individuals receiving polarized TikTok content 
would be likely to share his or her beliefs (Gachau, 2016). However, the hesitancy of Republican 
and Democrat participants to engage with a video based on political ideology goes against this 
idea. The ideal public sphere is one where all individuals have access and are without restriction 
to discuss matters of public opinion; however, this hesitancy to engage in any online political 
discourse opens the door for new research (Habermas et al., 1964). Just as Republicans and 
Democrats are ambivalent toward engagement based on political ideology, the Habermassian 





Figure 8: Republicans and Democrats “neither agree nor disagree” that they will engage with a 
TikTok video even if the poster aligns with their political beliefs. 
Democrat Filter (n = 8) 
Republican Filter (n = 24) 
 
 
Although the current study did not find support for hypotheses two and three (H2: Users 
will feel more inclined to engage with a TikTok video if the video aligns with their political 
beliefs, and H3: Individuals who self-identify as conservative will be more likely to share their 
political beliefs on social media platforms such as TikTok), there were positive results from this 
portion of survey questions. Despite recruiting more self-identified Democrat participants 
overall, there were more Republican participants who used TikTok. While causation cannot be 
drawn from this study, the findings suggest that TikTok users are more likely to identify as 
Republican (Republican condition n = 24, Democrat condition n = 8). However, those who 
identify as Republican and meet the filtered condition (“moderate” TikTok usage, “somewhat” 
interested in politics) are far more unlikely to recognize the effects of the TikTok algorithm than 
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Democrats. In the Republican sample, seven individuals (29.17%) responded that they “strongly 
disagree” that their “For You Page” adapts to content that they agree with. Democrat participants 
provided opposite results: no participants “strongly disagreed” that their “For You Page” adapted 
to content with which they agree. Moreover, half of Democrats “strongly agreed” that their “For 
You Page” adapts to content they agree with. 
Drawing partisan lines for analysis provided substantial results. From this survey (n=71), 
Republicans were more likely to use TikTok but less likely to notice the effects of the algorithm. 
Democrats were more aware of the algorithm filtering content from their feeds, but less likely to 
engage in any discourse based on the political affiliation of the poster. 
 
Figure 9: Combined chart of Democrat and Republican filter. 
Democrat Filter (n = 8), no responses for “strongly disagree”, most responses (37.50%) 
responses for “neither agree nor disagree” and “strongly agree”. 




RQ3: Do the results of media algorithms increase political polarization, thus influencing 
user’s willingness to speak out about controversial topics? 
RQ4: Are individuals more likely to experience a “spiral of silence” during the digital 
revolution of news gathering? 
 
 
Research questions 3 and 4 are informed by the spiral of silence theory and are grouped 
for evaluation and discussion. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) spiral of silence theory 
suggests that individuals are unlikely to share their beliefs when they hold an opinion that others 
might not share (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). Controversial topics and matters of delicate public 
opinion are the most likely to be suppressed in high-risk situations. 
Support for this theory and research question was found in the current survey responses. 
The majority of individuals (65.96%) under the TikTok use and political interest sample did not 
want to engage in online political discourse. They were “extremely unlikely” to defend their 
political beliefs on TikTok regardless of the subject matter. Only one filtered participant 
responded “extremely likely” to defend their beliefs on the app. The results were moderately 
consistent across all conditions (unfiltered, filtered for TikTok use and political interest, and both 
political affiliation categories). Because of this, we can suggest that individuals do experience a 
spiral of silence online and that digital news gathering hinders public discourse across the lines 
of political affiliation (H1: Limiting content based on user preference and algorithms will lead to 
the diminishment of public discourse based on political ideology). Findings from this survey 
suggest that individuals are likely to feel this opinion suppression when they hold minority 





It should be noted that flaws exist in the current research. Foremost, sampling errors were 
present in the current study. First, the use of a convenience sample hinders the generalizability of 
results. Unable to extrapolate to the representative population, the research is particularly low in 
external validity (Draugalis & Plaza, 2009). Without randomization of participants, a 
convenience sample does obstruct the results. Likewise, the results are skewed in terms of 
demographics of participants. The vast majority of participants are female (73.91%), leaving a 
very small and unrepresentative number of male responses (21.90%.) 2.92% of participants 
identified as a third gender; however, the study would prefer a larger, more representative 
number of non-binary participants. Likewise, the far majority (91.67%) of individuals identified 
as white, a definite shortcoming of this study. The political affiliation split is not representative 
of the United State population. The majority of participants are from the American South with 
responses coming from Texas, Arkansas, Kansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Undoubtedly, this 
sample is not representative of the larger United States population, contributing to sampling 
error. 
Second, the inability to prove causation through the use of a survey hinders this research. 
 
While surveys establish strong correlation between variables, the current survey is unable to 
prove causation between variables (Ksir & Hart, 2016). Likewise, correlational research does not 
allow the researcher to infer directionality of variables, ultimately a pitfall of the current survey 
findings (Ksir & Hart, 2016). 
Third, the timeline of the survey hinders this research, ultimately limiting the number of 
survey responses and participants. While active for 23 days, the survey gathered 137 responses 
with only 71 meeting the most important inclusion criteria (TikTok use and political interest). 
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With more time and longer recruitment methods, this study would expect to see a more 




The current study found that primarily white younger women across the political 
spectrum said they were not inclined to engage in political discourse on TikTok. Despite heavily 
using one of their generation’s most popular social networking apps, these individuals still 
experienced a spiral of silence and recognized the filter bubble of TikTok. While the current 
study cannot prove causation, the data suggests that digital news gathering has deeply impacted 
media theories (Draugalis & Plaza, 2009). The Habermaasian public sphere has shifted in the 
wake of media algorithms; this study suggests that political ideology and age may be associated 
with one’s ability to recognize these filtering systems. The online world juxtaposes the tenets of 
Habermaas’ public sphere: inviting more individuals into the public sphere also limits the 
content in which individuals see and discuss. 
The increase in advanced technology and dependence upon media algorithms in order to 
reflect user interest has created a new brand of news gathering for individuals. As algorithms 
increase in use their normalcy and integration into the online realm grow as well. Future 
discussion and studies should investigate this relationship and the increase or decrease of trust in 
these recommendation systems. Research regarding confidence in and reliance on content 
filtered by algorithms should be conducted in order to understand how deep this integration is, 
and to further understand the implications therein. Finally, future researchers should focus their 
attention on the intersection of media algorithms and agenda setting theory (McCombs & Shaw, 
1972). Both algorithms and agenda setting agencies create a “filter bubble” more alike than 
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different. More investigation is needed in order to understand the ethical boundaries, risk factors, 
and trustworthiness of algorithms as a primary means of news gathering. 
While unnoticed by the average social media user, algorithms have the unique ability to 
influence not only the content seen by users, but the salience and impression of that content. 
Moreover, the current findings highlight the complexity of the Habermassian public sphere. The 
mirage of a restriction-free online realm that allows discourse to flourish gives users the illusion 
that “news” from TikTok is accurate and bipartisan. Although individuals recognize their “For 
You Page” adapting to agreeable content, they still experience a “spiral of silence” when faced 
with a differing opinion. The algorithmic ability to create a “filter-bubble” diminishes the online 
discourse that takes place and provides users with the illusion of reality. Despite continuing to 
grow in popularity and its prevalence for “social communication”, the app inherently reaffirms 
pre-existing ideas and diminishes the effects of a restriction-free public sphere. Because of their 
advances and hyper-sensitivity, sophisticated algorithms highlight the irony surrounding the 
internet: a vast arena for news gathering actually narrows the scope of content for users, creating 
a filter bubble. By connecting users with like-minded individuals and presenting only relevant or 
agreed upon content, the democratic tendencies of online public spheres and discourse diminish. 
The internet is vast and growing as a primary news source for many individuals; however, the 
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1. What is your age? 
Appendix 
Appendix A 
Under 18, 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65-74, 85 or older 
 
2. How often do you use Tik Tok? 
A great deal, a lot, a moderate amount, a little, none at all 
 
3. I am interested in politics. 
Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 
4. What is your ethnicity? 
White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian 
or Pacific Islander, Other 
 
5. What is your gender identity? 
Male, Female, Non-binary/third gender, Prefer not to say 
 
6. In which state do you legally reside? 
Fill in the blank. 
 
7. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, 
or something else? 
Republican, Democrat, Independent, Something else 
 
8. I always use the following features on Tik Tok. 
Watch videos: Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, 
strongly disagree 
Comment on videos: Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat 
disagree, strongly disagree 
Like videos: Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, 
strongly disagree 
Make videos: Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, 
strongly disagree 
Search for videos that are interesting to me: Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree 
nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree 
Interact with friends of similar interests: Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor 
disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree 
 
9. As an estimation, how many hours a day do you spend on Tik Tok? 




10. Tik Tok cultivates videos that are of interest to me. 
Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 
11. I notice my Tik Tok “For You Page” adapting to content that I agree with. 
Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 
12. I notice my Tik Tok “For You Page” shielding content that I do not agree with. 
Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 
13. I notice that my “For You Page” provides me with content that is different from others. 
Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 
14. Generally speaking, I agree with the videos provided on my “For You Page”. 
Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 
15. I enjoy when I see a politically based Tik Tok. 
Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 
16. I am more likely to engage (like, comment, or share) with a Tik Tok if the poster agrees 
with my political beliefs. 
Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 
17. I am more likely to engage (like, comment, or share) with a Tik Tok if the users in the 
comment section agree with my political beliefs. 
Strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly 
disagree 
 
18. How likely are you to comment on a Tik Tok about liberalism or conservatism? 
Extremely likely, Somewhat likely, Neither likely or unlikely, Somewhat unlikely, Extremely 
unlikely 
 
19. How likely are you to defend your political beliefs on Tik Tok? 
Extremely likely, Somewhat likely, Neither likely or unlikely, Somewhat unlikely, Extremely 
unlikely 
 
20. When do you feel the most inclined to defend your political beliefs on Tik Tok? 
Fill in the blank. 
